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Deferring to the Judgment of Mental
Health and Related Professionals in
Striking the Constitutional Balance
Between Individual Liberty and the
Interests of the State
by Patrick Wiseman*
INTRODUCTION
When a plaintiff alleges that he has been institutionalized, physically
restrained, or medicated in violation of individual liberty,' and the
government urges that its conduct serves legitimate interests,2 should
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. B.A.,
University of Kent at Canterbury (1971); M.A., University of Colorado (1977); Ph.D.,
University of Colorado (1980); J.D., Columbia University (1980).
1. It is presumed throughout this discussion that institutionalization, use of
physical restraints, use of chemical restraints (psychotropic medication), and so forth
are deprivations of liberty in the constitutional sense. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) ("This Court repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment
for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection."); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1394 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1214 (1985) ("Given the undisputed nature of antipsychotic drugs, . . . a pretrial
detainee retains a liberty interest derived from the Constitution in avoiding unwanted
medication with such drugs."). For a more extended discussion of the liberty interests
at stake, see Costello and Preis, Beyond Least Restrictive Alternative: A Constitutional Right
to Treatment for Mentally Disabled Persons in the Community, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1527,
1538-42 (1987).
2. Legitimate government interests are those which bear a reasonable relation
to the purpose of the deprivation of individual liberty. Where the purpose of the
deprivation of liberty is to address the needs of the individual, only those government
interests which serve those needs are legitimate. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying
text. For this reason, the discussion will focus on civil deprivations of liberty, as criminal
deprivations legitimately serve purposes unrelated to the needs of the individual. See,
e.g., Turner v. Safley, -. U.S. - , 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987). "[W]hen a prison
regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Id. at 2261 (emphasis supplied).
Institutional interests, it will be argued, may not be exclusively relied upon to justify
civil deprivations of liberty.
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courts, in striking the balance between the competing claims, defer to
the judgment of mental health and related professionals? 3
The standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
Youngberg v. Romeo,4 requiring courts to defer to professional judgment
and to impose damages liability only when professional judgment was
in fact not exercised, unduly hampers the clarification of constitutional
rights. The concerns justifying deference to mental health professionals
are equally well addressed by granting those professionals qualified im-
munity. Deference effectively precludes courts from setting constitutional
limits within which professional judgment must be exercised. By granting
qualified immunity to a professional whose judgment is found to trans-
gress constitutional limits, courts would remain free to give constitutional
guidance to mental health and related professionals. In particular, such
professionals should be required to consider and to provide when feasible
that course of training, treatment, or habilitation which is least restrictive
of individual liberty.5
Section I of this article explicates the Supreme Court's deference-
to-professional judgment standard announced in Romeo. A critique of the
standard follows in section II. In section III it is argued that, by granting
qualified immunity rather than deferring to professional judgment, courts
have an opportunity to clarify constitutional limits within which mental
health professionals must decide on appropriate treatment. Section IV
examines judicial interpretations of the deference standard, and notes
the apparent absence of constitutional limits imposed on professional
judgment. Section V suggests how such limits might be clarified.
I. EXPLICATION OF THE DEFERENCE-TO-PROFESSIONAL-JUDGMENT
STANDARD ADOPTED IN YOUNGBERG V. ROMEO
In Youngberg v. Romeo, 6 Nicholas Romeo, an involuntarily committed
mentally retarded resident of Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a
3. For the purposes of this discussion, "mental health and related professionals"
includes psychiatrists, psychologists, mental retardation professionals, social workers,
and other professionals whose profession arguably involves them in the daily deprivation
of individual liberty in pursuit of concededly legitimate government interests.
4. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). The Court held that professional judgment is pre-
sumptively valid and that "liability may be imposed only when the decision by the
professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, prac-
tice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base
the decision on such a judgment." Id. at 323. See infra notes 16-22 and accompanying
text.
5. See infra notes 93-112 and accompanying text.
6. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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Pennsylvania institution, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three
administrators of the institution, claiming damages for the alleged vio-
lation of his constitutional rights.7 Romeo, who had been identified as
profoundly retarded, was committed to Pennhurst by his mother, who
could no longer care for him after his father's death.8 While at Pennhurst,
Romeo was injured numerous times9 and on occasion was physically
restrained.'
Romeo's case gave the U.S. Supreme Court its first opportunity
to consider the substantive rights of involuntarily committed mentally
retarded people under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution." Noting that the mere fact of pro-
cedurally proper commitment does not deprive a person of all substantive
liberty interests, 2 the Court held that both the right to personal safety
and the right to freedom from unnecessary restraint survive involuntary
commitment to a state institution. 13 The Court further held that someone
who is involuntarily committed to an institution has a right to such
training or habilitation 14 as is necessary to ensure safety and freedom
7. Id. at 309. No claims for injunctive relief were adjudicated because Nicholas
Romeo was a member of the class seeking such relief in another action. Id. at 311.
See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa.
1977), aff'd, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd and remanded, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
8. 457 U.S. at 309.
9. It is not contested that, while confined at Pennhurst, Romeo was in-
jured on over seventy occasions. These injuries were both self-inflicted and
the result of attacks by other residents, some in retaliation against Romeo's
aggressive behavior. The injuries included a broken arm, a fractured finger,
injuries to sexual organs, human bite marks, lacerations, black eyes, and
scratches. Moreover, some of plaintiff's injuries became infected, either
from inadequate medical attention or from contact with human excrement
that the Pennhurst staff failed to clean up.
Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 457
U.S. 307 (1982).
10. 644 F.2d at 155.
11. No state "shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. 457 U.S. at 315.
13. Id. at 315-16. The state had conceded that Romeo "has a right to adequate
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care." Id. at 315 (footnote omitted).
14. "Habilitation" is a term of art, describing the kind of training appropriate
to enhance the skills of mentally retarded people. It is to be distinguished from
"treatment," a term more appropriate to illness than to a developmental disability
such as retardation. "The word 'habilitation' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs
for the mentally-retarded because mental retardation is . . .a learning disability and
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from unnecessary restraint.1 5
The Court next considered the appropriate standard for determining
whether these rights have been violated and concluded that the question
must be resolved by "balancing [the individual's] liberty interests against
the relevant state interests." 16 Holding that "the minimally adequate
training required by the Constitution is such training as may be rea-
sonable in light of [the individual's] liberty interests in safety and freedom
from unreasonable restraint," the Court concluded that, in balancing
the competing interests and so determining what is "reasonable," courts
should defer "to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional." 17
The Court defined a "professional" decision maker as "a person com-
petent, whether by education, training or experience, to make the par-
ticular decision at issue ,''18 and held that a "decision, if made by a
professional, is presumptively valid." 19 "[L]iability may be imposed,"
the Court continued, "only when the decision by the professional is
such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, prac-
tice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually
did not base the decision on such a judgment.' '20 The Court thus adopted
"what is essentially a gross negligence standard' ' 21 for constitutional
training impairment rather than an illness. [T]he principal focus of habilitation is upon
training and development of needed skills." Brief for American Psychiatric Association
as Amicus Curiae 4, n.1, as cited in Romeo, 457 U.S. at 309 n.1 (brackets in original).
15. 457 U.S. at 319. The Court avoided the question whether a mentally
retarded person, involuntarily committed to a state institution, has some general
constitutional right to training per se, on the assumption that Romeo sought only
training related to safety and freedom from restraints. Id. at 318. Chief Justice Burger
would have held that there is no constitutional right to habilitation per se. Id. at 329-
30 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
16. Id. at 321. Given the Court's conclusion that a person involuntarily com-
mitted to an institution has the right to such training as is necessary to ensure safety
and freedom from restraint, provision of adequate training is presumptively sufficient
to protect the rights to safety and freedom from restraint. Thus, the Court addresses
next the standard for determining the adequacy of training, and adopts its balancing
test.
17. Id. at 322. It is worth noting that Nicholas Romeo suffered numerous
injuries while in the care of the very professionals to whom the Court now requires
deference.
18. Id. at 323 n.30.
19. Id. at 323 (footnote omitted).
20. Id. (footnote omitted).
21. Doe v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 709 F.2d 782, 790 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Catholic Home Bureau v. Doe, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
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review of state-authorized deprivations of individual liberty by mental
health or related professionals. 22
II. CRITIQUE OF THE ROMEO COURT'S DEFERENCE-TO-PROFESSIONAL-
JUDGMENT STANDARD
The Court gives four principal reasons for deferring to professional
judgment. First, says the Court, "[i]f there is to be any uniformity in
protecting these interests, this balancing [between an individual's liberty
interests and the relevant state interests] cannot be left to the unguided
discretion of a judge or jury."' 23 Second, limiting judicial review of
challenges to conditions in state institutions by requiring courts to defer
to professional judgment minimizes judicial interference with the internal
operations of these institutions. 24 Third, "there certainly is no reason to
think judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals
in making such decisions.'"'2 Finally, the presumption of the correctness
of professional decisions is necessary
to enable institutions of this type - often, unfortunately, over-
crowded and understaffed - to continue to function. A single
professional may have to make decisions with respect to a
number of residents with widely varying needs and problems
in the course of a normal day. The administrators, and par-
ticularly professional personnel, should not be required to make
each decision in the shadow of an action for damages.2 6
22. In another context, the Court has held "the Due Process Clause is simply
not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to
life, liberty, or property." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (action by
prisoner to recover damages for injury sustained when he slipped on a pillow negligently
left on stairway by sheriff's deputy), overruling Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
This circumstance should be distinguished from deprivations of liberty imposed delib-
erately rather than negligently and, although in pursuit of legitimate state interests, in
violation of constitutional standards. In other words, the due process clause is implicated
by a deliberate act of an official causing intended loss of liberty; under Romeo the
standard of review of such an act is whether it falls within professional standards.
23. 457 U.S. at 321.
24. Id. at 322 (footnote omitted).
25. Id. at 322-23 (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 324-35. Where damages are sought to compensate for prior violations
of constitutional rights, deference to professional judgment is arguably more appropriate
than when injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation is sought. "Obviously
the problem of hindsight interference with decisions made by hard-pressed professional
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None of the Court's reasons for deferring to professional judgment
is convincing.27 First, the goal of uniformity in decision making is ill
staff members . . . is a more serious one than that of assisting them in directing
prospective injunctive relief against appropriate state officials." Scott v. Plante, 691
F.2d 634, 637 (3d Cir. 1982).
27. Romeo was not the first occasion on which the Court had indicated that
government and individual interests might appropriately be balanced by deference to
professional judgment. In Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), a challenge to a
Georgia statute permitting commitment of children to mental institutions by their
parents with the concurrence of the hospital superintendent, the Court acknowledged
the child's liberty interest and held that some process is therefore due before the child
may be committed to a state institution. The Court then held that due process was
satisfied by a finding by a "neutral factfinder" that the child meets the statutory
standards for commitment. "Due process," the Court continued,
has never been thought to require that a neutral and detached trier of fact
be law trained or a judicial or administrative officer. . . . Surely, this is
the case as to medical decisions, for "neither judges nor administrative
hearing officers are better qualified than psychiatrists to render psychiatric
judgments." In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 942, 569 P.2d 1286, 1299
(1977) (Clark, J., dissenting). Thus, a staff physician will suffice, so long
as he or she is free to evaluate independently the child's mental and
emotional condition and need for treatment.
Id. at 607 (citation omitted). Under the Georgia statute, which was accordingly upheld,
this determination was made by a psychiatrist. Id. at 606-08. Insofar as the decision
is a purely psychiatric one, deference to professional psychiatric judgment may be
appropriate. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. More recently, the Court has
suggested that deference to professional judgment may also be appropriate in striking
statutory balances as well as constitutional ones. See School Bd. of Nassau County,
Fla. v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987), in which the Court held that a chronic
contagious disease (in this case, tuberculosis) is a handicap within the meaning of the
Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 which prohibits discrimination in federally funded
programs against "otherwise qualified" handicapped persons. 29 U.S.C. 5 794. In
determining whether someone with a chronic contagious disease is otherwise qualified
for the position or program sought, the Court held that "courts normally should defer
to the reasonable medical judgments of public health officials." 107 S. Ct. at 1131.
Deferring to professional judgment in striking a statutory balance is less problematic
than doing so to strike a constitutional balance, as it may be justified by reference to
the statute requiring the balancing. In other words, courts may appropriately defer to
the judgment of qualified professionals when directed to do so by the law-making
authority whose acts they are applying. Furthermore, legislatures may give guidance
to the professionals as to the appropriate standards or criteria to apply in striking the
balance. See, e.g., Board of Ed. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), in which the Court
interpreted the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1411 et seq. The Act sets forth detailed standards which states must observe in
educating handicapped children. Given this detailed legislative guidance, the Court
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served by the Court's conclusion that, in determining whether the balance
has been properly struck, courts should defer to professional judgment.
As the Court acknowledges, "[p]rofessionals in the habilitation of the
mentally retarded disagree strongly on the question whether effective
training of all severely or profoundly retarded individuals is even pos-
sible. " 2 With such profound disagreement among professionals, deference
to professional judgment is unlikely to guarantee uniformity.
Second, while judicial interference with the internal operations of
institutions should perhaps be minimized, inquiry into those operations
should not be foreclosed when the constitutionality of the conditions of
confinement is suspect. Indeed, in response to a challenge by a prisoner
to being "arbitrarily classified as mentally ill and subjected to unwelcome
treatment, ' 29 the Court has said:
[T]he inquiry involved in determining whether or not to transfer
an inmate to a mental hospital for treatment involves a question
that is essentially medical. The question whether an individual
is mentally ill and cannot be treated in prison "turns on the
meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert
psychiatrists and psychologists." Addington v. Texas, [441 U.S.
418, 429 (1979)]. The medical nature of the inquiry, however,
does not justify dispensing with due process requirements. It
is precisely "[t]he subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diag-
noses" that justify the requirement of adversary hearings. Id.,
at 430.30
If the medical nature of the inquiry does not justify dispensing with
procedural due process requirements, it is not clear why it should justify
held that courts should defer to professional judgment as to the appropriateness of an
educational program. Deference to professionals without such authority or guidance,
however, inappropriately gives law-making authority to professionals. The Court gen-
erally, and appropriately, counsels deference to professional judgment in contexts where
the decision is without constitutional content or implications. See Regents of Univ. of
Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985), in which a student's challenge of his exclusion
from an academic program was rejected. "When judges are asked to review the
substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they should show great
respect for the faculty's professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless
it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate
that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.
Cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)." 474 U.S. at 225 (footnote omitted).
28. 457 U.S. at 316 n.20.
29. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980).
30. Id.
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dispensing with substantive due process requirements, particularly when
the nature of the inquiry is as much constitutional as medical.
Third, the Court's definition of a "professional" decision maker as
"a person competent ... to make the particular decision at issue' ' s3
begs the rather important question of the nature of the "particular
decision." Where the decision is, for example, a purely medical one,
persons with medical education, training, and experience are presump-
tively qualified to make it, and courts might appropriately defer to such
judgment.3 2 But where the decision, although it arises in a medical
context, is constitutional, there is no reason to make the same pre-
sumption. The threshold question should therefore be whether the decision
at issue is a decision exclusively within the special expertise of the
particular professional. Where the decision is a constitutional one, courts
should not be required to defer to the judgment of professionals who
have no special constitutional expertise .33 At the very least, courts should
be permitted to inquire into the nature of the decision to determine
whether it raises constitutional questions and, if it does, to decide those
questions.
Finally, professionals would be as well protected from damages
actions by a grant of qualified immunity as by deference to their judg-
ment. Indeed, granting qualified immunity addresses all of the Court's
concerns equally as well as deferring to professional judgment while also
better protecting individual rights. The goal of uniformity in decision
making would be better served by granting qualified immunity than by
deferring to professional judgment, insofar as courts would be able to
establish uniform constitutional standards guiding professional judgment.
Furthermore, granting qualified immunity limits judicial interference with
the internal workings of institutions to occasions when such interference
31. 457 U.S. at 323 n.30.
32. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979).
33. However one defines a "constitutional" decision, where the question is
how individual liberty interests should be weighed against competing state interests,
there is little doubt of its constitutional dimension; and certainly there is nothing
uniquely medical about such a decision. See, e.g., In re M.P., 500 N.E.2d 216, 225
(Ind. App. 1986), modified, 510 N.E.2d 645 (Ind. 1987): "The [Romeo] proposition
that there is 'no reason to think judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate
professionals in making [treatment] decisions' may not be reasonably disputed. Con-
versely, however, I do not believe that there can be any quarrel with the proposition
that those professionals are not better qualified than judges or juries in balancing
delicate constitutional rights and duties" (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
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is appropriate, i.e., when the conditions of confinement are found to be
unconstitutional. One would also expect that professionals would welcome
constitutional guidance when a decision has constitutional ramifications
outside their particular sphere of expertise.
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO TOTAL DEFERENCE
TO PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT
In O'Connor v. Donaldson,34 the Supreme Court found for the first
time that a state cannot "without more" constitutionally confine a
nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom
by himself or with the help of others.3 5 The Court nonetheless held that
the defendant, the superintendent of a state institution, was entitled to
qualified immunity from money damages even though he had violated
the plaintiff's constitutional right to liberty. The appropriate question
for the jury, the Court found, was whether the defendant "knew or
reasonably should have known that the action he took within the sphere
of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of [Don-
aldson], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause
a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to [Donaldson]. "36
For purposes of this question, the Court concluded, "an official has, of
course, no duty to anticipate unforeseeable constitutional developments." 37
Thus, a state official, even though he has violated a plaintiffs
constitutional rights, enjoys qualified immunity from money damages.
Accordingly, he may be held liable only if he maliciously intended or
knew or should have known that his conduct would violate the plaintiff's
constitutional rights.
The option of granting qualified immunity to state agents, as in
Donaldson, permits courts to clarify individual constitutional rights while
34. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
35. Id. at 576. The cryptic phrase "without more" is the Court's own, and
apparently means that a state may not constitutionally confine someone who is not in
need of custodial care unless the state provides some form of treatment. See Comment,
"Without More:" A Constitutional Right to Treatment?, 22 Loy. L. REv. 373 (1976).
36. 422 U.S. at 577, citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)
(brackets in original).
37. 422 U.S. at 577 (citation omitted). The Court has granted qualified, "good
faith" immunity in actions brought under 42 U.S.C § 1983 to several different kinds
of state agents. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (state prison officials);
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232 (1974) (state governor, senior and subordinate officers of the State
National Guard, president of state-controlled university).
1988]
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protecting those agents from being unfairly held liable. If courts are
required to defer to professional judgment in determining whether the
constitutional balance has been appropriately struck between individual
liberty interests and state objectives, then the opportunity to clarify
constitutional rights is significantly diminished. This is, perhaps, the
most unfortunate consequence of the Romeo decision. The standard
declared in Romeo, insofar as it requires complete deference to profes-
sional judgment, goes too far in limiting the capacity of courts to clarify
constitutional limits on professional judgment. Yet, from the point of
view of the professional whose decision is challenged, it is hard to
discern a distinction between the imposition of liability only when the
decision "is such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person
responsible did not base the decision on such a judgment, ' 38 and the
imposition of liability only if the professional maliciously intended or
knew or should have known that his conduct would violate the plaintiff's
constitutional rights. From the point of view of the person whose liberty
is infringed upon, however, the distinction is a significant one, because
courts, in granting qualified immunity to professionals whose judgment
is challenged, can clarify the constitutional limits within which profes-
sional judgment must henceforth be exercised.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DEFERENCE-TO-PROFESSIONAL-
JUDGMENT STANDARD
A. Chief Justice Burger's Interpretation
Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the judgment in Romeo, in-
terpreted the majority's admonition to defer to professional judgment
to mean that, even if someone could demonstrate that his training
programs "were inconsistent with generally accepted or prevailing pro-
fessional practice - if indeed there be such - this would not avail
him so long as his training regimen was actually prescribed by the
institution's professional staff." 3 9 This extreme reading of the Court's
standard is surely mistaken; courts are not to defer to any and all
judgments of persons who happen to be professionals, but only to those
judgments which are in fact professional judgments. In other words,
38. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 323.
39. Id. at 331 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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Romeo requires courts to focus on the decision made, not on the decision
maker. Justice Burger's interpretation would entirely shield the judg-
ments of professionals, whether those judgments were professional or
not, from judicial review, a result clearly not intended by the majority.
Although lower courts have generally not been as extreme as Justice
Burger in their application of the Romeo standard, there has been some
confusion about its appropriate application. Nonetheless, emerging from
the application by lower courts of the Romeo standard is the principle
that there is an individual right to treatment in conformity with pro-
fessional judgment, neither more nor less.
B. The Right to Treatment in Conformity With Professional
Judgment
1. Neither More ...
In Johnson v. Breje,40 criminal defendants found unfit to stand trial
challenged the conditions of their confinement in a state mental insti-
tution. The court, citing Romeo, said:
To determine whether the plaintiffs' constitutional rights have
been violated, it is necessary to balance the plaintiffs' liberty
interests against the relevant state interests in securing a safe
facility in which treatment can be administered. . . . It is not
our duty, however, to perform the balancing. The Constitution
only requires us to make certain that in deciding to restrict
the movements of the plaintiffs, a professional judgment was
exercised.4 1
The court concluded with respect to defendants' refusal to permit
outdoor activities that professional judgment had in fact not been
exercised. The defendants had not justified the restriction "in terms
of legitimate interests in treatment and security, "42 and so the court
upheld the district court's injunction of the practice.4 3
The court in Phillips v. Thompson44 was more explicit in its deference
to the constitutional judgment of professionals, saying, "we glean from
40. 701 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1983).
41. Id. at 1208-09 (citations to Romeo omitted) (emphasis in original).
42. Id. at 1208-09.
43. Id. at 1209-10.
44. 715 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1983).
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[Romeo] that it must be determined whether professional judgment in
fact was exercised in balancing the liberty interest of the class members
against relevant State interests." ' 45 Applying this extreme deference to
professional judgment, the court concluded "the liberty of movement
of class members [described by the court as "several hundred higher
functioning but mentally retarded adults' ' 46] was limited only by the
reasonable requirements of caring for a large number of handicapped
people in an institutional setting as such requirements were determined
by the professionals who directed the operations of these institutions."
47
The appellate court in Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v.
Cuomo48 was most extreme in its deference to professional judgment
and chided the district court for its assumption that the professional
judgment standard is violated "if experts at trial disagree with care or
treatment decisions that were actually made, or think another course
of conduct would have been better." 49 The district court had noted the
agreement of all experts, both defendants' and plaintiffs', that
many clients of the [Suffolk Developmental] Center could be
safer, happier and more productive outside the institution in
small community residences. Their professional judgment was
that transfers should be made as soon as the facilities could
be made available. . . The Constitution mandates commu-
nity placement for those who have been adjudged by qualified
professionals to require a community setting.
50
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, rejected the district
court's analysis of the expert testimony, saying
"professional judgment" has nothing to do with what course
of action would make patients "safer, happier and more pro-
ductive." Rather, it is a standard that determines whether a
particular decision has met professionally accepted minimum
standards. . . .Expert testimony is thus relevant not because
of the experts' own opinions - which are likely to diverge
45. Id. at 368 (emphasis supplied).
46. Id. at 366.
47. Id. at 368.
48. 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984).
49. Id. at 1248.
50. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300,
1347 (E.D.N.Y.), vacated, 737 F.2d 1253 (1984), dismissed as moot 103 F.R.D. 168
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd, 832 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1987).
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widely - but because that testimony may shed light on what
constitutes minimally accepted standards across the profession. 51
Several other courts have applied an extreme interpretation of the
Romeo deference-to-professional-judgment standard in various contexts,
holding facially constitutional a state's statutory procedures governing
voluntary, involuntary, and emergency commitment;5 2 permitting in-
voluntary administration of psychotropic drugs;-3 approving procedures
for patient consent to administration of such drugs; 54 upholding pro-
cedures for restraint and seclusion of mental patients; 55 declaring
constitutional the placement of mentally retarded people in institutions
rather than community living arrangements; 56 holding that accreditation
51. 737 F.2d at 1248 (citations omitted). See also Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d
1243 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S.Ct. 44 (1987). "The constitutional minimum
standard of habilitation ... relates, not to the qualitative betterment of a retarded
person's life, but only to the training necessary to afford him safety and freedom from
bodily restraint. Whether that training is adequate must be determined in light of
expert testimony; no constitutional violation exists unless the level of training is such
a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment or standards as to dem-
onstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a
judgment." 807 F.2d at 1250.
52. Project Release v. Prevost, 551 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (E.D.N.Y. 1982),
aff'd, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983): "Due process does not necessitate a full adversarial
hearing before a legally-trained factfinder in every situation; in determining the rights
of the mentally ill, review by an independent medical expert may be sufficient."
53. Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128, 131 (W.D. Wisc. 1985): "[W]hatever
rights plaintiff has to refuse antipsychotic drugs are measured by whether the decision
to administer such drugs is a 'substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice or standards.' [Romeo,] 457 U.S. at 323." But see U.S. v. Charters, 829 F.2d
479 (4th Cir. 1987) (refusing to apply deference standard to forcible medication of
pretrial detainee with antipsychotic drugs).
54. R.A.J. v. Miller, 590 F. Supp. 1319, 1321 (N.D. Tex. 1984): "The proper
balance between individual rights and relevant state interests is achieved, and due
process satisfied, as long as the restrictions on liberty are imposed by the exercise of
professional judgment."
55. Doe by Roe v. Gaughan, 617 F. Supp. 1477, 1486 (D. Mass. 1985), aff'd,
808 F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1986): "[T]he present procedures for the use of restraint and
seclusion are based on the exercise of professional judgment, as contemplated in Romeo,
and thereby adequately protect the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs."
56. Daniel B. v. O'Bannon, 633 F. Supp. 919, 924 (E.D. Pa. 1986): "[T]he
[U.S. Supreme] Court has not yet held that there is a constitutional right to confinement
in the least restrictive alternative. In [Romeo], the Court held due process satisfied if
restraints are imposed on a mentally retarded individual by decision of a qualified
professional in accordance with accepted professional standards." The court nonetheless
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of state institutions by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hos-
pitals is prima facie proof of constitutionality of the conditions of con-
finement; 57 upholding removal of a child from a foster home; 58 and
even denying damages in an action for the fatal shooting of a prisoner
during an escape attempt.
59
Each of these courts interprets the Romeo standard to mean that
a constitutional balance of individual liberty interests against competing
interests of the state has presumptively been struck, if professional
judgment has been exercised. Thus, professional judgment, though it
infringe on individual liberty, is presumptively valid, even if the balance
is struck in favor of interests of the state which are inconsistent with
the liberty interests of the individual and which serve only the efficiency
of the institution. Not all courts, however, have been so grudging in
their application of the Romeo standard.
2. . . . Nor Less
In Thomas S. v. Morrow,60 a young, mentally retarded man who
had been a ward of the state since birth challenged his placement in
a night care unit at a detoxification center as violative of his substantive
due process rights under the fourteenth amendment. He alleged that
his hospitalization imposed a degree of restraint on his liberty incon-
sistent with professional judgment concerning his appropriate
approved a settlement agreement under which the defendants would fund community
placements for the plaintiffs.
57. Concerned Citizens for Creedmoor, Inc. v. Cuomo, 570 F. Supp. 575
(E.D.N.Y. 1983); Woe v. Cuomo, 559 F. Supp. 1158 (dismissed) (E.D.N.Y. 1983),
aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 729 F.2d 96, 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 936 (1984): "JCAH approval represents an 'exercise of professional judgment'
to which we must defer under [Romeo] . . . [But] JCAH accreditation is merely prima
faie proof of adequacy, and . . . a court is not barred from probing behind it if
presented with evidence that JCAH has, across-the-board or in a given instance,
allowed its standards to slip below constitutional benchmarks."
58. Gibson v. Merced County Dept. of Human Resources, 799 F.2d 582, 590
(9th Cir. 1986): "[Decisions made by appropriate professionals are to be presumed
correct."
59. Newby v. Serviss, 590 F. Supp. 591, 598-99 (W.D. Mich. 1984): "[P]laintiff
did not submit evidence from which reasonable people could conclude that either
defendant . . . failed to exercise any professional judgment with respect to Clarence
Newby's right to reasonably safe conditions while confined."
60. 601 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D.N.C. 1984), aff'd as modified and remanded, 781
F.2d 367 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1992 (1986) and 107 S. Ct. 235 (1986).
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treatment. 61 Mental retardation professionals had repeatedly recom-
mended that Mr. S. be given a placement in the community, but
such a placement had never been provided for him. 62 Despite the fact
that Mr. S. sought injunctive relief, rather than damages, which had
been sought in Romeo, the District Court applied the Romeo test, as
did the Fourth Circuit in affirming the lower court's conclusion that
Mr. S.'s rights had indeed been violated. Furthermore, although Romeo
dealt with the rights of persons involuntarily committed to state in-
stitutions, the Thomas S. court applied Romeo's standards to a person
under state guardianship, noting that the liberty interests protected
by the Romeo court did not arise because of the institutional confine-
ment but rather pre-existed it. 63 In remedying the violation of Mr.
S.'s rights, the district court had relied on the recommendations of
the state's professionals. 64 As the appellate court explained, "[t]he
presumption of validity accorded the professionals' decision about
appropriate treatment has not been rebutted. Consequently, in the
absence of evidence that the decision is a 'substantial departure from
accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards,' the district
court was required to accept the recommendations of the qualified
professionals ....,'65
Thus, despite the unsupported allegation by the defendant that
Mr. S. had received minimally adequate treatment consistent with
professional judgment, 66 the court affirmed the district court's order
requiring appropriate community placement .67
The Thomas S. court's application of the Romeo standard is inter-
esting for several reasons. First, the court interpreted Romeo to apply
outside the institutional context, to cases where the state, which has
no obligation to provide any services at all, 68 has chosen to provide
services. Second, the court applied the professional-judgment standard
to a request for prospective relief, although the standard had been
announced in a case seeking only retrospective relief. Finally, the court
61. 781 F.2d at 373.
62. Id. at 369-74.
63. Id. at 374.
64. Id. at 375.
65. Id. at 375.
66. Id. at 374.
67. Id.
68. See Romeo, 457 U.S. at 317: "As a general matter, a State is under no
constitutional duty to provide substantive services for those within its border."
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permitted application of the standard offensively, rather than defensively,
despite the assertion by the defendants that their conduct met the
minimal standard established by the Romeo decision. In so doing, the
court rejected Justice Burger's narrow interpretation of the standard,
as the decision to place Mr. S. in the detoxification center had pre-
sumably been made by qualified professionals. It was not, however, a
"professional judgment" in the sense required by Romeo because it was
"based on expediency and a decision to save money. "69
As in Thomas S., equitable relief was sought in Clark v. Cohen,70
in which a mentally retarded woman who had spent her entire adult
life in an institution sought an injunction requiring her placement in
a community living arrangement. The district court issued an injunc-
tion, directing the defendants (various officials of the Pennsylvania
mental health/mental retardation system) to release Ms. Clark from
the state institution in which she had been confined and to pay for a
program of services for her outside the state institution.7 1 The defendants
appealed on two grounds. First, even assuming that they had violated
Ms. Clark's constitutional rights, the defendants claimed that the elev-
enth amendment bars any relief beyond ordering her release from the
institution.72 Second, the defendants contended that Ms. Clark's con-
stitutional rights had not been violated.7 3 The second contention is of
particular interest here.
The professional staff at the state institution in which Ms. Clark
had been confined had agreed since 1976 that institutional placement
was inappropriate and that she should have been transferred to a
community residential facility.7 4 Their efforts to secure such a placement,
however, were frustrated by the defendants. 75 As the appellate court
saw it:
we are dealing with a plaintiff who was committed without
notice or a hearing as the result of a petition containing an
69. 781 F.2d at 375.
70. 613 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 794 F.2d 79 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 459 (1986).
71. 613 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
72. 794 F.2d at 82. The court rejected the defendants' eleventh amendment
defense on the basis that injunctive relief which remedies a past constitutional violation,
even if costly, does not breach the eleventh amendment. Id. at 83-84.
73. Id. at 82.
74. Id. at 85.
75. Id. at 85-86.
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incorrect diagnosis, and who was retained against her will
without a hearing for over twenty-eight years. Moreover we
are dealing with a plaintiff who repeatedly requested that the
persons in charge of her detention arrange for such a hearing,
requests which were endorsed by the professional staff of the
institution. Finally, we are dealing with a plaintiff as to whom
the professional staff of the institution recommended against
the kind of treatment to which she was subjected. 76
The Third Circuit upheld the district court's finding that Ms.
Clark's "substantive rights not to be unnecessarily institutionalized and
to receive the minimally adequate training that was the only purpose
of her commitment were violated." ' 77 Citing the Romeo professional
judgment standard, the court held that Ms. Clark's continued con-
finement in the state institution, in the face of unanimous professional
judgment that she should be released from the institution and provided
a community placement, was a violation of her substantive liberty right
to appropriate treatment under Romeo.
78
Finally, in Wells v. Franzen,79 a claim by a prisoner for damages
and for declaratory and injunctive relief against various prison officials
for injuries stemming from his nine-day confinement in bodily res-
traints,80 the court said "Federal courts should avoid undue interference
with the operations of state institutions. Judges and juries are not better
qualified than trained professionals to determine an appropriate treat-
ment, . . . and the due process standard is based on norms set by the
mental health professionals.' '81 The court also noted, however, that
76. Id. at 86.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 87. See also Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 629 F. Supp. 1487 (N.D. Tex.
1986), in which the district court concluded that someone confined to an institution
against his best interests is unduly restrained to the same extent that an individual
shackled to his wheelchair is unduly restrained. 629 F. Supp. at 1494. "If professional
judgment dictates that community placement is necessary in the best interest of the
individual, then the individual has a constitutional right to such placement, and
continued confinement in the institution constitutes undue restraint." Id. at 1494-95
(citation omitted). This conclusion is apparently undisturbed by the opinion of the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversing another order of the district court in the same
case. Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 44
(1987).
79. 777 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1985).
80. Id. at 1260.
81. Id. at 1262 (citations to Romeo omitted).
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[the] right to be free of bodily restraint absent a proper
determination of need is infringed if prison guards interfere
with medical personnel who are exercising professional judg-
ment. Restrictions imposed by guards, which are medically
unjustifiable in connection with restraint (and which have no
adequate security rationale), could infringe on plaintiff's due
process rights. . . . Total body restraint is a severe intrusion
that may defeat constitutional challenge only in limited cir-
cumstances defined by professionally approved mental health
standards. If nonprofessional prison employees arbitrarily and
without good reason (such as safety) preempt the exercise of
judgment by professionals, they risk violation of the due proc-
ess rights of prisoners.8 2
Each of these courts, then, interprets the Romeo professional judg-
ment standard to mean that a person has an affirmative right to
professionally prescribed treatment, so long as there is relative unanimity
among the responsible professionals about the appropriate treatment.
Failure to provide such treatment is a violation of substantive due
process.
C. Summary
Courts have therefore interpreted the Romeo standard to mean, on
the one hand, that the Constitution is presumptively satisfied by the
exercise of professional judgment and, on the other, that the constitution
guarantees one the right to such services as unanimous professional
judgment dictates."3 In short, when the state seeks civilly to deprive
one of liberty in pursuit of state interests, one has a constitutional right
to treatment in conformity with professional judgment, no more and
no less. The total judicial deference to professional judgment which
these cases exemplify84 restricts the ability of courts to clarify the
82. Id. at 1263 (citations omitted).
83. These interpretations of the standard are not mutually exclusive; the first
is likely to be stressed by defendants, the second by plaintiffs.
84. The cases in the second group discussed above (see supra notes 60-82 and
accompanying text) are perhaps more protective of individual rights than those in the
first group (see supra notes 39-59 and accompanying text). Nonetheless, both groups
of cases exemplify a greater degree of deference to professional judgment than should
be constitutionally required.
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constitutional limits within which professional judgment must be
exercised.
Unless constitutional limits are established within which profes-
sional judgment must be exercised, we run the risk that individual
liberty interests will not be given appropriate weight in the balance
against competing state interests. Especially in the institutional context,
but also in other human service settings, professional interests may
conflict with individual liberty interests.8 5 The damaging effects of such
a conflict of interest may be ameliorated if constitutional parameters
for the exercise of professional judgment are established.
V. CLARIFYING THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON PROFESSIONAL
JUDGMENT
A. Identifying Legitimate Government Interests
The nature and duration of any civil deprivation of individual
liberty by the state must be reasonably related to a legitimate purpose. 86
Certain state interests will not serve to justify a civil deprivation of
liberty.87 In particular, the decision to deprive someone of liberty may
85. See U.S. v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987). "[T]he use of anti-
psychotic medication may present a substantial conflict of interest for institutional
professionals because, quite apart from its therapeutic benefits, the medication serves
the institutional goals of maintaining control and ameliorating staffing costs." Id. at
497. The court considers this a sufficient reason not to defer to professional judgment;
it is surely sufficient reason to establish constitutional limits within which professional
judgment must be exercised.
86. "At the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of com-
mitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed." Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). Although the Supreme
Court has characterized Jackson as a "procedural due process case" (see Romeo, 457
U.S. at 320 n.27), the Court implied that where the purpose of commitment is "to
provide reasonable care and safety," such should be provided. Id. See also O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975): "[A] state cannot constitutionally confine
without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom
by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends,"
suggesting that, should a state confine such a person, the state must provide "more"
than simply custodial confinement. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
87. That the State has a proper interest in providing care and assistance
to the unfortunate goes without saying. But the mere presence of mental
illness does not disqualify a person from preferring his home to the comforts
of an institution. Moreover, while the State may arguably confine a person
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not be based "on exigency, administrative convenience, or other [non-'
professional] criteria," nor may it be based on financial constraints. 89
Civil deprivations of liberty may be justified by reference to either
the state's police power or its parens patriae authority. 90 Neither source
of state authority permits "government to control individual lives in'
the name of helping its citizens." 91 Under either rationale, then, the
deference-to-professional-judgment standard should be understood to
require that decisions involving deprivation of liberty be based on
appropriate professional criteria bearing on the individual's need for treat-
ment, habilitation, or other services, and not on matters essentially
irrelevant to individual treatment such as institutional convenience.
92
to save him from harm, incarceration is rarely if ever a necessary condition
for raising the living standards of those capable of surviving safely in
freedom, on their own or with the help of family or friends .... May the
State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its citizens from
exposure to those whose ways are different? One might as well ask if the
State, to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all who are physically
unattractive or socially eccentric. Mere public animosity cannot constitu-
tionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 575 (citations omitted).
88. Clark v. Cohen, 613 F. Supp. 684, 704 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 794 F.2d
79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 459 (1986) (footnote omitted).
89. The Supreme Court in Romeo implicitly recognized that financial constraints
would not justify a treatment decision in concluding that a "professional will not be
liable if he was unable to satisfy his normal professional standards because of budgetary
constraints." 457 U.S. at 323. This suggests that budgetary constraints are not per se
relevant to a professional treatment decision. See also Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d
367, 375 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1992 (1986) and 107 S. Ct. 235 (1986).
90. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded,
422 U.S. 563 (1975); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
91. U.S. v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 494 (4th Cir. 1987) (footnote omitted).
92. See, e.g., In Re Mental Commitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645 (Ind. 1987).
"In order to protect the patient's liberty interest in being free from unwarranted
intrusions into his body and mind, it is necessary to determine which of the interests
reflected by the psychiatrist is the foundation for his decision to treat the patient with
anti-psychotic drugs." Id. at 647. Corollary to the principle that deprivations of
individual liberty must be justified by reference to the treatment or habilitation needs
of the individual is the principle that deprivations which are so justified must be
accompanied by treatment or habilitation which meets those needs. "If a state court
orders a mentally retarded person committed for 'care and treatment,' . . . I believe
that due process might well bind the State to ensure that the conditions of his
commitment bear some reasonable relation to each of those goals. In such a case,
commitment without any 'treatment' whatsoever would not bear a reasonable relation
to the purposes of the person's confinement." Romeo, 457 U.S. at 326 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
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In the context of civil deprivations of liberty, among the criteria
professionals should be constitutionally required to consider is the use
of the least restrictive alternative to achieve the purposes of the treat-
ment. Use of means more restrictive than necessary to achieve the
government's ends is inherently arbitrary, insofar as it exceeds the
state's parens patriae authority or police power and should therefore be
held to be a violation of due process.
B. The Least Restrictive Alternative
Even though government may act in furtherance of legitimate
objectives, it should be required to choose that alternative course of
action least restrictive of individual liberty, to assure that individual
liberty interests are being appropriately weighed in the balance.93
The Supreme Court, in Romeo, noted that the question of least
restrictive means was not before it.9 4 A panel of the Third Circuit, in
Rennie v. Klein,95 considered the application of the Romeo standard to
the administration of antipsychotic drugs to an involuntarily committed,
mentally ill patient. Despite the Supreme Court's disclaimer, Judge
Garth, for a plurality, concluded that a least intrusive means analysis
is inconsistent with the Romeo decision, and held:
antipsychotic drugs may be constitutionally administered to
an involuntarily committed patient whenever, in the exercise
93. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960): "[E]ven though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved." See also San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
51 (1973): "Only where state action impinges on the exercise of fundamental consti-
tutional rights or liberties must it be found to have chosen the least restrictive alter-
native." See also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 385-86 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting):
Although this Court has never approved the practice, it is possible that an
inmate will be given medication for reasons that have more to do with the
needs of the institution than with individualized therapy .... We should
not presume that he lacks a compelling interest in having the decisions to
commit him and to keep him institutionalized made carefully, and in a
manner that preserves the maximum degree of personal autonomy.
(citations and footnote omitted; emphasis supplied). See generally Comment, The Right
to Treatment in the Least Restrictive Alternative: The Confusion Remains After Youngberg v.
Romeo, 19 NEw ENC. L. REV. 175 (1983).
94. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 313-14 n.14.
95. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983), on remand from the Supreme
Court for reconsideration in light of Romeo, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
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of professional judgment, such an action is deemed necessary
to prevent the patient from endangering himself or others [that
being the statutory standard for commitment]. Once that de-
termination is made, professional judgment must also be ex-
ercised in the resulting decision to administer medication. 96
Judge Weis, concurring, found it "regrettable" 97 that the court
so construed Romeo and would have held that "professional judgment"
should be relied upon only if "it includes an evaluation aimed at the
least intrusive means - a cost-benefit analysis viewed from the patient's
perspective.' '98 Judge Weis continues:
A "professional judgment" based primarily on administrative
convenience or the purely economic interest of the state does
not pass muster. If less intrusive means to accomplish the
state's legitimate objectives are available and feasible, then
administrative and financial concerns are simply not significant
enough to justify a patient's exposure to the serious risks
accompanying use of these drugs. 99
Finally, Judge Weis notes:
Introduction of the least intrusive means standard does not
supplant professional judgment; it merely adds an important
factor to the analysis underlying that judgment. The least
intrusive test does not constitute undue interference with pro-
fessional judgment, and is surely defensible to the extent it
mandates serious and deliberate consideration of the patient's
interest. 100
Several other courts have hinted that a least restrictive means test
is not inconsistent with Romeo. In Santana v. Collazo,10' for example,
96. 720 F.2d at 269-70 (footnote omitted).
97. Id. at 275 (Weis, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 276 (Weis, J., concurring).
99. Id. (Weis, J., concurring). According to Judge Weis, these considerations
are especially important in a case involving administration of antipsychotic drugs, the
long-term effects of which are more adverse than the effects of long-term physical
restraint, to which Nicholas Romeo was subjected. However, it is not obvious that
any such significant infringement of liberty can be justified by administrative or financial
concerns. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
100. 720 F.2d at 277.
101. Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974
(1983).
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involving a challenge by juveniles to the use of isolation in an industrial
school and juvenile camp, the court, citing the Romeo standard, sug-
gested, "if the state can avoid the current extensive use of isolation
by minimal additional attention - to distinguishing between and at-
tempting to address the sources rather than the effects of the residents'
behavior problems, it may well be unreasonable for the state not to
do so.'" 10 In Bee v. Greaves,10 3 in which the forcible administration of
antipsychotic drugs to a pretrial detainee was challenged, the court
interpreted Romeo to have "declined to apply a 'less restrictive means'
analysis. 10 4 Noting, however, that "[a]ny decision to administer an-
tipsychotic drugs forcibly must be the product of professional judgment
by appropriate medical authorities, applying accepted medical stan-
dards,"1 05 the court held that, in making such a decision, the availability
of less restrictive alternative courses of action, "such as segregation or
the use of less controversial drugs like tranquilizers or sedatives, should
be ruled out before resorting to antipsychotic drugs.'
10 6
Other courts, however, have held that one has a constitutional
right to provision of services or treatment in the least restrictive
environment only if such treatment is necessary in the judgment
of professionals. 1 7 In Society for Goodwill to Retarded Children v.
102. 714 F.2d at 1182.
103. Bea v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214
(1985).
104. Id. at 1396 n.7.
105. Id. at 1396 (citations to Romeo and Rennie v. Klein omitted).
106. Id. (footnote omitted). See also U.S. v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir.
1987), in which the Fourth Circuit avoided application of the Romeo standard in a
case presenting the question whether a pretrial detainee, found incompetent to stand
trial, may be forcibly medicated. The court distinguished Romeo on several grounds
and concluded that, rather than defer to professional judgment in balancing the
competing individual and government interests in such a case, courts should perform
the balancing. The court held, "unless it is determined that, without medication, a
patient presents an immediate threat of violence that cannot be avoided through the
use of less restrictive alternatives, there is no justification for the intrusion into fun-
damental liberties that forcible medication represents." 829 F.2d at 493. Although the
Charters court rejected the deference standard, it effectively established some consti-
tutional limits within which professional judgment must henceforth be exercised.
107. See, e.g., Clark v. Cohen, 613 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 794
F.2d 79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 459 (1986). See also Ass'n for Retarded
Citizens of North Dakota v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 486 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd, 713
F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983): "[A] constitutional right to the least restrictive method of
care or treatment exists only insofar as professional judgment determines that such
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Cuomo, 1' the court rejected even this reading of Romeo, concluding that,
even if there is unanimous expert testimony to the contrary,'09 "there
is no constitutional right to a least restrictive environment.' '110
Introduction of a least intrusive means analysis, however, while
perhaps inconsistent with Justice Burger's extreme deference standard,
is not inconsistent with an appropriate degree of deference to professional
judgment. While there may be reason to suppose that professionals do
not wish and should not be required to make treatment decisions in
the shadow of an action for damages,"' granting qualified immunity
to such professionals provides them with as much protection from
unfairly being held liable as would deferring to their judgment. Fur-
thermore, it is far better that courts give constitutional guidance to
professionals whose profession involves them in the daily deprivation
of individual liberty interests in pursuit of legitimate state objectives
than that they leave to such professionals the task of striking the
appropriate balance. Providing constitutional guidance to such profes-
sionals does not amount to an assumption that these professionals "are
insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution."I 2 On the contrary,
provision of such guidance presumes that professionals will accept it.
When liberty interests are at stake, considerations of administrative
convenience and budgetary constraints should not be permitted to justify
their deprivation. Accordingly, professionals should be required to con-
sider and to provide when feasible that course of treatment which is
least restrictive of individual liberty. If arbitrary restrictions on indi-
vidual liberty are to be avoided, courts should strike the balance between
individual liberty interests and competing state interests with reference
to the least-restrictive-alternative principle (and require professionals to
do likewise).
alternatives would measurably enhance the resident's enjoyment of basic liberty in-
terests." See also Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 629 F. Supp. 1487 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (discussed
supra note 78).
108. Society for Goodwill to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d
Cir. 1984).
109. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
110. 737 F.2d at 1249 (citations omitted). See also Gieseking v. Schafer, 672 F.
Supp. 1249, 1267 (W.D. Mo. 1987): "[No] federal constitutional right to community
placement exists where the [Department of Mental Health] fails to so place an individual
after professional recommendation for such placement."
111. See supra text accompanying note 26.
112. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981).
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CONCLUSION
Romeo establishes that involuntary residents of mental retardation
institutions have the constitutional rights to safety and freedom from
unnecessary restraint and to such training or habilitation as is necessary
to enable them to enjoy these rights. Romeo subverts these rights,
however, by requiring courts to defer to the judgment of institutional
professionals in determining whether the balance has been properly
struck between the individual liberty interests recognized in Romeo and
the competing state interests. The extension of the Romeo standard to
other cases challenging a governmental infringement of individual liberty
subverts individual liberty still further. There is no reason to suppose
that institutional and other professionals will weigh individual liberty
interests as heavily in the balance as competing government interests. 13
Moreover, deference to professional judgment precludes any further
clarification of the scope of constitutionally protected liberty in each
context to which the deference standard is extended. Courts should
therefore extend the deference standard beyond the specific context
within which it arose only with extreme caution.
It would be more appropriate in most contexts for courts to de-
termine whether a constitutional violation has occurred, by weighing
the competing interests rather than deferring to professional judgment
on that question. Then, if a constitutional violation is found and the
professional's conduct meets the standard set forth by the court in
Donaldson,"4 the court should grant good-faith immunity to the pro-
fessional whose judgment is challenged. If one reason for deferring to
professional judgment is to avoid holding professional staff liable for
well-intentioned decisions made under stressful conditions, granting
qualified immunity serves that purpose equally well. Another reason
offered for deferring to professional judgment is that courts are ill-
prepared to make medical and other "professional" judgments. This
claim simply begs the question. If the judgment to be made is a
constitutional one, then courts are not only uniquely qualified to make
113. "The Court . . . placed in the hands of human service bureaucrats the
power to balance the constitutional rights of their wards against their own institutional
needs, according presumptive validity to the state's resolution of this balancing process."
Note, Due Process and Judicial Deference to Professional Decisionmaking in Human Service
Agencies, 35 SYRAcusE L. REV. 1283, 1305 (footnote omitted). See also supra notes 86-
89 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
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such decisions, but are bound to do so. Courts should not abdicate to
medical and other professionals their constitutional duty to weigh in-
dividual liberty interests against competing state interests. At the very
least, courts should give guidance to professionals whose judgment has
constitutional ramifications, and should be permitted to inquire into
the nature of the decision to determine whether such guidance is
appropriate. Clarification of the constitutional limits within which pro-
fessional judgment must be exercised, by incorporation of the least-
intrusive-means analysis, would be a step in the right direction, as it
would require professionals to base their judgment, at least in part,
on relevant constitutional grounds and would provide courts with con-
stitutional grounds to review the judgment of professionals. Further-
more, such clarification would provide courts, once liability has been
found, with criteria for design of an appropriate injunctive remedy.
Finally, the grant of qualified immunity permits courts to clarify the
constitutional standard without unfairly imposing liability on profes-
sionals who may not be expected to anticipate the clarification.
